

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

PRIVATE

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ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE NINETEENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 12 April 1962, at 10 a.m.

THE UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

FEB 15 1963

DOCUMENT  
COLLECTION

Chairman:

Mr. BURNS

(Canada)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. de MELLO-FRANCO  
Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS  
Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO  
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV  
Mr. N. MINTCHEV  
Mr. G. GUELEV  
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON  
U Tin MAUNG  
U Aye LWIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY  
Mr. J.F.M. BELL  
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK  
Mr. M. ZEMLA  
Mr. E. PEPIKH  
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. GEBRE-EGZY  
Mr. P. SAHLU  
Mr. M. HAMID  
Mr. A. MANDEFRO

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL  
Mr. A.S. MEHTA  
Mr. C.K. GAIROLA  
Mr. M.B. NAIR

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. A. CAGIATI  
Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI  
Mr. F. LUCIOLI-OTTIERI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO  
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. A. de ICAZA

Nigeria:

Mr. A.A. ATTA  
Mr. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI  
Mr. M. LACHS  
Mr. M. BIEN  
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU  
Mr. M. MALITZA  
Mr. E. GLASER

Sweden:

Mr. R. EDBERG  
Baron C.H. von PLATEN  
Mr. H. BLIX  
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN  
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. V.N. ZHEREBTSOV  
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN  
Mr. A. EL-ERIAN  
Mr. W.S. AHMED  
Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER  
Sir Michael WRIGHT  
Mr. D.N. BRINSON

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN  
Mr. C.C. STELLE  
Mr. R. SPIERS  
Mr. T.R. PICKERING

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUFTI

Deputy to the Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Canada). I declare open the nineteenth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): We have again read most carefully the verbatim records of the Sub-Committee on the discontinuance of nuclear tests. We have noted with profound regret and concern that once again there has been no progress. Indeed, a careful reading of the records of the last two meetings of the Sub-Committee shows that each side has rigidly maintained its position. This I think, is the source of the trouble. We note with satisfaction that the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godber, did bring to the attention of the other two Powers many of the suggestions made here, but we very much regret that neither side was willing to consider these suggestions. It impressed me as being, if I may say so, discourteous that after we had made so many appeals that our suggestions should be studied, neither side was willing even to express a preliminary view on any of them. If my reading of the records of these two meetings is correct, each side simply stated and restated its position.

Time is getting short, and we may very well be approaching a state of affairs where it may be too late to do anything. I intervene this morning to ask the nuclear Powers -- indeed to beg them -- to be courteous enough to consider what Ministers of various countries have submitted here for their consideration; we can see that if they continue along the present path no result will be reached. They will simply restate their respective positions, simply take more time. There will be no bargaining, no negotiation. This, we believe, will serve no useful purpose either for themselves or for us.

I understand that there is to be a meeting of the Sub-Committee this afternoon. Perhaps at that meeting the nuclear Powers would be kind enough to take a look at the various suggestions which have been made.

It is my feeling that in this respect, as in others, no one has a monopoly of wisdom. To me it is disturbing that people should refuse in such an important matter to consider the feelings and opinions of others and instead should simply maintain rigidly their own respective position. This, I think, is not a very healthy attitude for our future work, because if it is transplanted into other fields there is absolutely no value in our presence here. If I may say so, consideration should be given to our views, humble as they are, even though we do not pretend that they will solve every problem. We feel that we -- not only as

(Mr. Gebre-Egzy, Ethiopia)

representing ourselves but as representing the views of the majority of the world -- are entitled to some consideration. We feel that our views should be considered and discussed, because if this is done there may come to light some desire for accommodation.

Mr. LALL (India): We in the delegation of India agree with what the representative of Ethiopia has said. It is a matter of grave concern to the Government of India that there has been no solution yet -- we stress "yet" -- to this grave problem.

It is not that ideas and suggestions are not available to the two sides for consideration, as the representative of Ethiopia has just pointed out. Indeed what is extraordinarily disconcerting and difficult to understand is the apparent unwillingness on the part of those primarily concerned to give consideration to other ideas. We of course realize that those who are most directly concerned must give the major emphasis to their own thinking on this matter. However, as we said before, there are not just two sides to this question; there is a third and much larger side, and that is the rest of the world itself. This apparent refusal to consider the point of view of the rest of the world in this matter is to us incomprehensible, and we have had no explanation of this attitude from the two sides.

This is something which goes beyond normal feelings of regret. I do not speak now of any such aspect of the matter as amour-propre or indignity -- not at all. We are thinking of a lack of capacity to take into account the effects of actions which are being considered and which are looming over this Conference and over the world itself. It is this that makes us feel strongly about this matter and makes us regret very deeply the entrenched positions which have been taken up.

I am directed by the Government of India today to appeal, in the name of the Government, against the resumption of nuclear tests by any country during the pendency of the Conference. The Government of India would take this opportunity to urge the three nuclear Powers to try again to reach an agreement. With all our capacity for indicating the urgency and the grave importance of the situation, we would request the nuclear Powers to take this appeal into consideration.

(Mr. Lall, India)

Surely the purpose for which we have met here in this Conference, namely, disarmament, is not easily reconcilable with the further perfection and development of means of mass destruction in a world situation in which it is well known that either side is able to destroy the world several times over. It is utterly inconceivable and incomprehensible to the vast masses of the world that countries which are already possessed of this appalling capacity for total annihilation should seek further to perfect their means of destruction of this small planet of ours

So the Government of India appeals to the countries directly concerned not to resume nuclear tests during the pendency of this Conference, so that the work of the Conference may go on. It will indeed be a heavy responsibility if the resumption of tests by any country should result in difficulties in the pursuit of our endeavour here, and I very much fear that difficulties of a grave character will be created if there is a resumption of testing by any country. In the light of the sentiments which I have tried to express this morning, we hope that this whole issue will be given serious and practical consideration again by the countries directly concerned.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): The attempt at conciliation being made here by certain delegations is certainly very laudable. The Italian delegation fully appreciates it, especially as we share the grave concern of those delegations. I need only refer in this connexion to the statement I made at the meeting on 2 April (ENDC/PV.13). As I said then, the discontinuance of nuclear tests should, in our opinion, be considered in relation to our security. Like the other disarmament measures, this one -- the discontinuance of tests -- should not endanger the security of any party. On the contrary, it should increase that security. Without international control, however limited it may be, security would be endangered. Anyone who is objective and impartial cannot fail to recognize that.

On the other hand, we appreciate that the security of a country can also be threatened by espionage activities. No one denies it. Consequently we need to reconcile these two requirements and establish a minimum of international control which cannot jeopardize military secrets. It is precisely with that object in view that the United States and United Kingdom delegations have made specific proposals.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

I refuse to believe that an agreement on this issue is impossible. The Conference has already done good work. On several questions compromise texts are in sight. If such progress has been achieved in several matters thanks to the goodwill shown by everyone, must we admit to a hopeless deadlock on such an important problem as this?

Unfortunately, it seems to me on reading the records of the Sub-Committee, that the Soviet delegation has so far been avoiding a really thorough examination of the following question: how could international control be organized without revealing military secrets relating to matters other than tests?

Let the Soviet delegation tell us what is troubling it and how it believes that the system proposed by the Western Powers would endanger Soviet military secrets. Unfortunately, the Soviet delegation seems to wish to oppose any form of international control on principle, to oppose it absolutely, even if it is reduced in scope and entrusted to neutral countries. I repeat, even if such international control were entrusted to non-aligned countries. Is this not really carrying distrust too far? It is an attitude which grieves us deeply, especially as it does not correspond -- we are happy to say -- to the general line taken by the Soviet delegation in other matters. Up to the present, the Soviet delegation has affirmed that it is not intransigent or inflexible. In regard to several questions it has said: "Here are our proposals; make yours and we will try to reach agreement".

So let me make a fresh appeal to the Soviet delegation to adopt a conciliatory attitude on the question of tests also. The peoples of the whole world are waiting for the Soviet delegation to say one conciliatory word -- one word confirming that the Soviet Union, having accepted the principle of international control in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5), is prepared to apply that principle sincerely and effectively.

Mr. EDBERG (Sweden): We in the Swedish delegation agree with what the representatives of Ethiopia and India have said this morning in regard to the urgency of an agreement on a test ban treaty. We should like to add a few words.

The report from the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests which we received yesterday with feelings of regret and distress makes in a way strange reading when we consider that, in spite of everything, there seems to be complete unanimity among the nuclear Powers on the necessity of banning nuclear weapon tests.



(Mr. Edberg, Sweden)

Better than any others, the leaders of the great Powers know what a nuclear war, to which a continued nuclear arms race may lead us, would mean. In his speech to the General Assembly last autumn, President Kennedy drew a picture of how "Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or by madness". He added, "The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us". (A/PV.1013)

And Prime Minister Khrushchev has said:

"Imagine what will happen when bombs begin to explode over cities. These bombs will not distinguish between Communists and non-Communists. Everything alive can be wiped out in the conflagration of nuclear explosions."

As a consequence of these concurring views, the leaders of the great nations also agree that the most important task right now is to ban nuclear weapon tests. Again, may I quote President Kennedy who, in the letter he addressed to this Conference on the subject of a nuclear test ban, emphasized that:

"At this juncture in history no single measure in the field of disarmament would be more productive of concrete benefit in the alleviation of tensions and the enhancement of prospects for greater progress." (ENDC/7, page 10).

And Prime Minister Khrushchev in April 1958 wrote in a letter to President Eisenhower:

"Hardly anyone will deny that the discontinuance of experiments with atomic and hydrogen weapons would greatly improve the international political atmosphere as a whole and would create more favourable conditions for the settlement of other unsolved international problems."

It may also be appropriate in this connexion to quote a few words from a letter which the Permanent Representatives of the Commonwealth countries to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General in September of last year:

"Every effort should be made to secure rapid agreement to the permanent banning of nuclear weapon tests by all nations and to arrangements for verifying the observance of the agreement. Such an agreement is urgent, since otherwise further countries may soon become nuclear Powers, which would increase the danger of war and further complicate the problem of disarmament."

(Mr. Edberg, Sweden)

Similar views have on several occasions been expressed by the representatives of the nuclear Powers during our deliberations here in Geneva. We are convinced that both sides sincerely want an agreement on a nuclear test ban. Yet we are constantly faced with the depressing fact, the latest evidence of which we had in the negative report yesterday, that the great Powers are unable to translate their wishes into reality.

During the weeks we have been here we have become familiar with the obstacles which block the road. Some of them are of a technical nature; others, and more important, are political.

It would be unrealistic to underestimate these obstacles. They should, however, be viewed with the fact that the nuclear Powers represent only a little more than 15 per cent of the world's population. These Powers ought to ponder the fact that continued nuclear weapon tests equally concern the other 85 per cent of the world's population.

The nuclear Powers carry a burden of responsibility which is the concern of all mankind. They would perhaps find the sacrifices involved in reconsidering and changing some of their individual attitudes less fearsome and more worthwhile if viewed in this global perspective. Such changes of position are certainly tantamount to sacrifices for individual countries, but the problem of a test ban treaty cannot be solved without such sacrifices on the part of both sides.

The non-nuclear Powers also have a responsibility in this question. They have both a right and a duty to voice their opinions, give their views and present their suggestions. It is worth noting that the non-aligned countries which are represented at this Disarmament Conference have reached similar or identical conclusions on a number of fundamental issues. This was quite evident from last week's plenary debate in this hall. I refer specifically to our debate of last Monday and Tuesday. I need not repeat the arguments and suggestions that were put forward by the various delegations. I only wish to say that so many delegations indicated agreement on the general lines of a system of control, and this is a fact which we think should not be neglected.

We therefore sincerely appeal to the nuclear Powers and to their representatives in this hall to give serious, thorough and speedy consideration to the suggestions which have been put forward by the non-aligned delegations on several occasions in the course of our deliberations here.

Mr. BARRINGTON (Burma): My delegation can only join the delegations of Ethiopia, India and Sweden in expressing profound regret that the verbatim records of the sixth and seventh meetings of the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests (ENDC/SC.1/PV.6 and PV.7) reveal that the position remains substantially as it was before this subject was discussed by the Conference last week. Our regret is all the greater because we sincerely believed, and continue to believe, that the ideas and suggestions which our discussions brought forth could open the door to fresh and more fruitful negotiations between the nuclear Powers represented here. In particular, we felt that the solution might be found in a combination of the national systems of detection, to which one side is so heavily wedded, and an international system of verification, which is so exclusively favoured by the other. Unfortunately, the record shows that this idea was not even seriously explored. However, we remain convinced that if a nuclear test ban treaty is ever signed it will be on this basis.

Some people think that the root of the immediate difficulty is that the nuclear Powers want to conduct another series of tests. Quite frankly we do not believe it, but of course it is not possible to be certain. But on one thing we are quite certain, and it is this: any talk about the possibility that the situation would be improved after both sides had had their tests is patent nonsense. Good has never come out of evil, and it is no use trying to delude ourselves on this score.

For this reason, my delegation makes yet another fervent appeal to the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests to make a fresh attempt at a break-through which will open the door to a treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests for all time, and will thereby in turn open another door to agreement on general and complete disarmament.

While these efforts are being made, we appeal to the nuclear Powers to refrain from nuclear tests in any form, since such tests could only bring to a halt any effort to end them.

Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): We have studied the views expressed in the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. The result of its work, which, unfortunately has so far been negative, has had a great effect on public opinion. The attitude of its members, which the public considers unyielding, has given rise to many feelings, but we can be sure that admiration is not among them.

(Mr. Padilla Nervo, Mexico)

It appears that the debates in the Sub-Committee and the statements made by the parties had two purposes. The first was to determine which of the Powers started the competition and the race in nuclear weapon explosions. That is a historical question. The second was to determine which side is to blame for the treaty not being signed and for both of them starting new series of nuclear tests. That is a question of immediate interest.

The answers to these two questions may not be interrelated, but this approach to the problem only stresses the question of responsibility and appears to accept the regrettable conclusion that it is indeed impossible to avoid the new series of atmospheric explosions announced by the nuclear Powers.

This threat to the higher interests of mankind is what people everywhere are concerned about. Public opinion condemns the concrete fact of nuclear weapon tests, no matter which Power carries them out or what reason is invoked for doing so. It is no consolation to the peoples on either side to believe that the other side is responsible, nor can such a belief be accepted. Two wrongs do not make a right, nor do two untruths make a truth. To put the blame on one side or the other would only be a satisfactory and constructive thing to do if it served to prevent the resumption of nuclear tests by both sides. But public opinion condemns invoking the question of responsibility solely to justify reprisals in an atmosphere of ever-increasing distrust.

The present and future dangers of radioactivity are no longer questioned. The arms race can have no outcome but war, and nuclear war offers no security to any of the parties concerned or to the world. Nuclear competition reduces this security every day; the nuclear Powers are not alone on this planet and we think they should heed the outcry of the public. Some people are often overcome with despair at the idea that this is only a voice crying in the wilderness. We hope that some day the wilderness will be populated with willing listeners.

The public asks in fear: Since both sides were willing to propose the discontinuance of atmospheric tests on former occasions, and since the scientists have recognized that it is possible not only to detect but also to identify explosions in the atmosphere, in the biosphere and under water, why should the need for such explosions be admitted now?

My delegation fully endorses the ideas expressed by the speakers who preceded me, and believes it to be our duty to come to the defence of the moral law and the legal order which should govern the conduct of States. The great Powers should bear this in mind and give it most serious consideration. The

(Mr. Padilla Nervo, Mexico)

delegations present here hope that the representatives of the great Powers will submit the suggestions made so far to their respective governments and will be able to give us their views on them. We firmly hope so because we are convinced that there is nothing in the world, except freedom, that is worth one hour of suffering or anguish for millions of human beings. And it must be recognized that in the event of a nuclear catastrophe, both suffering and freedom would cease to exist. In that event, not even freedom would be necessary, because there would no longer be anybody to enjoy it.

Mr. HASSAN (United Arab Republic): As will be recalled, in my statement before this Committee on 3 April (ENDC/PV.14) I had occasion to ask the nuclear Powers to give their careful consideration to the various thoughts and ideas expressed by the non-aligned members of our Committee. Since then, however, new and more pressing developments have taken place in the form of the joint statement of the United States and the United Kingdom presented to Chairman Khrushchev (ENDC/24), and the memorandum of 3 April by the Soviet Union (ENDC/20) to the effect that if the United States carried out its intention of conducting atmospheric tests the Soviet Union would be obliged to take similar measures.

Our Conference has therefore reached that crucial stage when its work will soon be accompanied by the frequent occurrence of atomic explosions coming from the United States and the Soviet Union. In these circumstances we consider that our primary and most urgent objective should be the prevention of this unhappy possibility from materializing and from prejudicing the chances of subsequent negotiations for the conclusion of a final treaty.

I feel in duty bound to sum up clearly in this regard the position of the Government of the United Arab Republic:

1. We are opposed to the resumption of any and all nuclear tests;
2. We believe that the technical and political difficulties of the problem of a nuclear test ban should not preclude the possibility of agreement on interim measures for halting nuclear tests while negotiations are under way at this Conference.

In this connexion I wish to recall the appeal made by the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic when, speaking on 23 March at this Conference, he said:

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

"We trust that in the meantime the four Governments which are principally and directly involved in this vital matter will come more into line with the feelings and convictions in this regard of all the peoples of the world and that they will actually, if not yet contractually, withhold any further nuclear weapon tests in order, among other things, to afford a better and wider scope for agreement that seems at the present moment to be available."

(ENDC/PV.8, page 32)

In this regard, too, we should all be giving the most loyal interpretation of and the strictest adherence to General Assembly resolution 1648 (XVI), which says in its second operative paragraph:

"Earnestly urges the States concerned to refrain from further test explosions pending the conclusion of necessary internationally binding agreements in regard to tests",

and which says in its third operative paragraph:

"Expresses confidence that the States concerned will reach agreement as soon as possible on the cessation of tests of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, under appropriate international controls."

We do not deny the highly technical and complicated character of the problem of working out a test ban treaty with effective safeguards and guarantees. But, on the other hand, no one could deny to the peoples of the world their right to expect from us a prompt end to the suicidal nuclear race which looms before humanity with fear, suspicion and insecurity.

What would be the verdict of history on a conference in which statesmen stood helpless before such a problem of vital importance to mankind? Are we to allow ourselves to confess our inability to find a solution for this problem? And is man's ingenuity, which conquered outer space, incapable of matching it with equal resourcefulness in producing a prompt solution for an urgent problem which endangers mankind?

This is the considered opinion of the United Arab Republic which we hope will be taken in its true perspective, as a sincere and genuine approach and an honest, if modest, contribution to the cause of world peace and harmony as we see it in the United Arab Republic.

Mr. ATTA (Nigeria): Please permit me to associate the views of my Government with the various views already expressed this morning by the representatives of Ethiopia, India, Sweden and other countries.

I must confess that it came as a great shock to my delegation as well as to my Government to see the joint statement by the United States and the United Kingdom on nuclear testing which was circulated to us on the 9th of this month and further expounded and elaborated yesterday by the representatives of those two Governments.

My Government is deeply disappointed at the last sentence of that statement, which makes it clear that the series of tests scheduled for the latter part of the present month will have to be carried out. My Government feels equally disappointed with the statement dated 3 April 1962 which has been submitted by the Government of the Soviet Union to the United Nations Disarmament Commission on the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. We are deeply concerned at that part of the statement which says that if the Western Powers should resume nuclear explosions in the atmosphere:

"... the Soviet Union will be compelled to conduct tests of new types of its own nuclear weapons in order to strengthen its security and maintain world peace". (ENDC/20/Rev.1, page 3)

To all of us who have been engaged in this discussion, which has lasted for five full plenary meetings and seven Sub-Committee meetings, the impasse which has now been reached is bound to cause great disappointment. To many of us the area of disagreement did not seem such as to be insurmountable if there had been a little bit of goodwill and sincerity on both sides. Many of us have not been convinced by the arguments of the two sides. Indeed, it is possible to trace several contradictions in the positions taken by the two sides since 1956, if we examine either the United States-United Kingdom offer of 3 September 1961 (GEN/DNT/120) or the Soviet Union offer of 28 November 1961 (ENDC/11). Indeed, it is possible to find some contradictions between the findings of the experts who met here in Geneva between 1 July and 21 August 1958 (EXT/NUC/28) and the conclusions of Technical Working Groups 1 (GEN/DNT/TWG.1/9) and 2 (GEN/DNT/HAT/8).

Furthermore, the political positions of the two parties have changed a great deal on whether the nuclear test ban issue should or should not be discussed within the framework of all questions relating to general and complete disarmament. But what the world wants is not polemics or arguments, but concrete evidence of sincerity and the will to reach an agreement on an issue which is bound to give rise to an arms race.

(Mr. Atta. Nigeria)

We have now been told by the two opposing sides that every effort to reach an agreement has been exhausted. This, to my mind, is not the case. The Western Powers, I believe, have claimed that all they want is a minimum of international inspection or on-site inspection of unidentified events. We have, however, not seen any fresh proposals that take into account advances in science since 1958 or that would remove us from the sphere of their original plan, which led to an impasse. To many of us there are various ways to work out an on-site inspection scheme or a verification scheme based on some form of international organization. But we fail to find this variety in the plan submitted by the Western Powers. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has been uncompromising in its plan, which seeks a solution to our problem by the utilization of national detection equipment, even though it recognizes the difficulty of detecting and locating unidentified events. Both sides have accused each other of carrying out secret preparations before September 1961: in the case of the Soviet Union for its series of its atmospheric tests; and in the case of the United States for its series of underground tests. Many of us feel, however, that nothing can be gained by these sterile arguments. What has been needed and is still needed is sincerity and a spirit of give-and-take with a view to reaching a compromise solution.

My Government has therefore instructed us to ask the two sides to examine the very many compromise solutions which have so far been submitted by various countries. These plans accept the basic points of both sides. They also recognize the need to approach the problem from a new angle, which will be compatible with the national interest of each side. The suggestions may not be ideal but an ideal plan now, outside the framework of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, is probably not realizable. The suggestions, however, can work if there is goodwill and a sincere desire to make them work. Although science and scientists have been quoted lavishly by both sides, it is our view that the issue with which we are concerned is essentially political; the aid of science is merely required to give the arguments added faith.

The third alternative which has been submitted by various nations allows further room for negotiation, but not for sterile negotiation. These submissions take into account all the nations of the world because it is believed that the life of all is concerned in the present issue. Above all, these alternatives have sought to impress upon the minds of the nuclear Powers that their own plans may not necessarily be the ideal ones in the circumstances now prevailing. The lines



(Mr. Atta, Nigeria)

of demarcation in their viewpoints are not such as to justify further tests. We do not believe that further tests by either side will strengthen the cause of peace or give further security.

Both parties have claimed in their recent speeches that the vast majority of the representatives to this Conference support their point of view. For example, the United Kingdom representative stated that the majority of other members of the Disarmament Committee support a reasonable demand "for an international, impartial check of the observance of a treaty ..." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.6, page 11).

At the same meeting the representative of the Soviet Union said:

"... the overwhelming majority of the members of the Committee - have unanimously declared that nuclear weapon tests should be immediately stopped and not resumed in any form." (Ibid., page 30)

It is hoped that, now that the views of this majority are known, the two minorities will in turn give their assent to the views of the majority which have been quoted so lavishly in the past.

Before ending this speech, I should like to say that my Government wishes to stress that the manner in which a compromise solution would be accepted by either side would be a test of the sincerity which is so badly needed in these negotiations.

Mr. de MELLO-FRANCO (Brazil) (translation from French): The delegation of Brazil joins the delegations of Ethiopia, India, Sweden, Burma, Mexico, the United Arab Republic and Nigeria in expressing its disappointment and regret at the negative results of the work of the three-Power Sub-Committee. The resumption of nuclear tests can only serve to improve armaments. But in the opinion of the Brazilian delegation progress in the manufacture of armaments does not increase security or the chances of peace; it can only increase the risks of war and disaster.

World opinion will never understand why the great Powers refuse to combine their scientific knowledge and resources to work for peaceful progress for the benefit of mankind, but only strive to compete in preparing for an incomprehensible race towards destruction and death.

The Government of Brazil still hopes that the nuclear Powers will be able to find a reasonable basis for agreement.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): We have listened with great attention to the statements made by the representatives of many countries, who undoubtedly expressed not only the opinion of their Governments and their peoples, but also that of a great number of people throughout the world who are concerned about the situation which has arisen in connexion with the question of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, and who demand with ever-growing insistence the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests.

The situation which has now developed in regard to this question is especially alarming and threatening. It has become particularly alarming after the statement made by the United States and United Kingdom Governments (ENDC/24), of which we were informed yesterday by the representatives of these countries. This statement, as commented on by Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber, shows that the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom have thrown down a challenge to the entire world by confirming once again that course of their foreign policy which cannot but lead to a new spurt in the nuclear armaments race and to aggravation of the whole international situation.

In addition to underground tests of nuclear weapons, which those Governments have been carrying out for months - for over six months, to be more precise - the United States and the United Kingdom intend to resume within the next few days the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. They have already warned all countries that as from 15 April - that is to say, in three days' time - all sea-going vessels and aircraft should keep away from the neighbourhood of Christmas Island, where the United States and the United Kingdom are going to conduct their atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons.

It is precisely this fact which makes clear the position of these Governments on the question of reaching an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, and the joint statement of 9 April by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom is a perfectly obvious manoeuvre aimed at shifting the responsibility for what they are doing on to the Soviet Union.

In speaking of this, we are not revealing any secret. This is evident from the very text of the statement by Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Macmillan. It follows from this statement that the United States and United Kingdom have, apparently, decided to prevent any agreement and to carry out, in implementation of the plans of the United States military circles, a new series of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere and to start thereby a new spurt in the nuclear armaments race.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

At the present time these Powers are merely seeking pretexts that would help them to justify themselves, at least to some extent, in the eyes of world public opinion. They are trying, as in the past, to shelter behind technical arguments that are untenable in these days regarding the necessity of international control over compliance with an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. In order to dash completely the hopes of those who, in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 1648 (XVI) of 6 November 1961, to which one of the speakers referred just now, demand the cessation of all nuclear weapon testing while negotiations on this question are going on, the United States and the United Kingdom have put forward their ultimatum. They declare that either the USSR must agree to their demand for international control and inspection or they will resume the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere in the second half of April.

In putting forward this demand, the United States and the United Kingdom know in advance that international control and inspection over the cessation of tests are unacceptable to the Soviet Union in the absence of an agreement on general and complete disarmament and while there is an increased threat of war. In these circumstances international control and inspection would only serve as a cloak for international espionage.

It is obvious that in insisting on these demands, which are unacceptable to the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom are concerned not about reaching an agreement but only about finding a pretext for frustrating it and for justifying their tests, including tests in the atmosphere.

We consider that another reasonable, realistic and mutually-acceptable solution to the question of tests should be found which would nevertheless put an end to all nuclear explosions. The aggravation of the international situation, which has been mentioned by all of the previous speakers, is bound to take place and will be obvious to all, if the tests scheduled by the United States are resumed. In this connexion I should also like to clarify a point raised by some of the speakers, namely, that all nuclear Powers are preparing to resume testing. That is not consistent with the facts. The Soviet Union is not preparing to resume tests and has declared quite openly that it is in favour of putting an end to all nuclear weapon tests and is against their resumption.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

When it is alleged in the United States press and in United States official statements that the Soviet Union itself is preparing to test, and for that reason is unwilling to accept an agreement on the conditions proposed by the United States, this is an obvious manoeuvre for the purpose of justifying the United States' own intentions, which it mentioned in the official statement of 9 April (ENDC/24).

Some representatives who made statements here spoke as though it were a foregone conclusion that nuclear weapon tests would be resumed by the United States, that they would be resumed in the Soviet Union, and that perhaps after that there would be some sort of agreement. That is how some speakers spoke on this subject in the course of our debate. Today, however, the representative of Burma made a statement to which I should like to draw your attention. He said that if this were to happen, the situation would not be improved but would be worse than at present. I think he was right. If nuclear weapon tests are resumed by the United States at the present time, this will lead to very serious consequences for the cause of peace and for the work of this Conference. And, of course, it is not a question of what will happen after the resumption of testing by the United States and the Soviet Union; it is a question first and foremost of what will happen if the United States resumes testing. That is the crux of the matter at the present time. That was why we listened with great attention and, I would say, with concern, to the statements which were made by all who have spoken today and in which anxiety was expressed regarding the resumption of nuclear weapon tests.

The question now facing us is a specific one: we must find a radical solution to this problem in order to put an end to all nuclear weapon tests. In the search for such a solution we should consider all the proposals and views which have been put forward at this Conference and outside it. We have stated our position. We maintain this position, but we are prepared to give careful consideration to all the views that have been put forward at the present meeting and in the course of our discussions. We are prepared to ponder all the possibilities that exist in order to ensure the signing of an agreement on the discontinuance of all nuclear weapon tests. However, it will be absolutely impossible to do anything in this regard if tests are resumed. That is why the thought expressed by the representative of India - and in essence supported by all the speakers - to the effect that we should strive to ensure that no tests are resumed while negotiations are going on in our Committee, is a proposal which deserves the most serious consideration at this juncture. This would be a minimal step which could avert a further dangerous development of world events.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

In this connexion I should like to remind you of a statement made by the Soviet Government on 28 November 1961, in which concrete proposals were put forward for the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests and for the establishment of control on a national basis, but which also contained the following important provision:

"It goes without saying that an agreement by all nuclear States not to conduct any kind of nuclear tests while the negotiations are going on would contribute to the success of the negotiations. The Soviet Government, although it has carried out considerably fewer nuclear weapon tests than the United States, the United Kingdom and France, is nevertheless prepared to give such an undertaking, if the other States do likewise". (ENDC/11, page 6).

I confirm this statement of the Soviet Government, and I consider it necessary that we should hear in the Committee the reply of the United States and the United Kingdom to this vitally important question: are they prepared not to resume nuclear weapon tests while negotiations in our Committee are going on? The Soviet Government agrees not to do so.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I have listened with the greatest interest to the ideas expressed by the representatives of Ethiopia, India, Sweden, Burma, Mexico, the United Arab Republic, Nigeria and Brazil. I am deeply distressed at the charge of discourtesy to the eight new members of the Eighteen Nation Committee. No such discourtesy was ever intended. I had thought that we had courteously and patiently examined all proposals, and that we had courteously and carefully explained the history of the negotiations and the present state of scientific knowledge at least from our standpoint; this is, briefly, that nuclear events cannot be identified by distant instrumentation. Nevertheless our scientists are here and we have gone over all of these matters with them with the utmost care. I assure the representatives who have spoken that all of their ideas on a nuclear test ban treaty not only have been but will continue to be considered with the utmost seriousness. I had thought that my statement yesterday showed that we had been careful to take all these ideas into consideration.

One thing is clear from the statement of the representative of the Soviet Union. Despite the extraordinary number of proposals we have made since 21 March 1961, and despite our proposal to make the treaty comprehensive, to remove the threshold, to try to work out a distinction between seismic and non-seismic areas by the Soviet Union in the field of inspection, there is no evidence at all that the Soviet Union has paid any heed.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

I shall, of course, report to my Government with the greatest care everything that has been said by the representatives of all delegations here. I do feel, however, that in all good conscience I must point out that throughout last spring and summer we were being assured, again and again, at the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, by the representatives of the Soviet Union -- and, indeed, this assurance was given by Chairman Khrushchev himself -- that the Soviet Union was not preparing for testing. And yet, while we were at the very Conference table, we heard the announcement that the Soviet Union was unilaterally breaking the moratorium that the United States had scrupulously observed.

I must say -- with great regret -- that we just do not have confidence that the Soviet Union will adhere to any such pledge for longer than it serves Soviet national interests. Nor do we believe that it is a sound precedent, in disarmament agreements, to base disarmament measures on mere pledges, without any effective international control arrangements to monitor the implementation of those measures.

President Kennedy put the issue succinctly in his speech of 2 March last when he said:

"If the Soviet Union should now be willing to accept such a treaty", -- the President was referring to a treaty similar to the United States-United Kingdom proposal of 18 April 1961 --

"sign it before the latter part of April, and apply it immediately -- if all testing can thus be actually halted -- then the nuclear arms race would be slowed down at last -- the security of the United States and its ability to meet its commitments would be safeguarded and there would be no need for our tests to begin.

"But this must be a fully effective treaty. We know enough now about broken negotiations, secret preparations and the advantage gained from a long test series never to offer again an uninspected moratorium."

(ENDC/13, pages 9 and 10)

That is the statement of the President of the United States. I submit that our experience in relying upon the word of the Soviet Government with respect to its adherence to a moratorium has not been a happy one. I shall, of course, report to my Government the appeal of the representative of India that the nuclear Powers should forgo any resumption of nuclear weapon tests while negotiations in Geneva are continuing.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

However, I think I should call attention to the fact that -- if my recollection serves me correctly -- last summer, at the time when the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations was going on in Belgrade and when the Soviet Union had broken its moratorium pledge and was testing, we continued to negotiate with the Soviet Union, and Mr. Zorin, Mr. McCloy and I arrived at an agreement on the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles of 20 September 1961 (ENDC/5). We placed before the United Nations our programme for general and complete disarmament. We continued to carry on our test ban treaty negotiations. We continued to press our resolution in the United Nations for a test ban treaty. And, despite the fact that the United Nations itself requested the Soviet Union not to make a further test, the Soviet Union tested.

I think that the United States record of moving forward is concretely before you. I think the United States record of trying to continue the negotiations is concretely before you. I think the Soviet Union record of refusing even now to go forward with the control posts and on-site inspection to which it had previously agreed is concretely before you.

Let me repeat: I am tremendously impressed by the statements made here this morning and I shall report them to my Government. But I do wish to call attention to the official statement of the President of the United States and to the joint statement of Prime Minister Macmillan and President Kennedy which I read into the record of the Conference at the plenary meeting on 11 April.

Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) (translation from French): The Polish delegation is deeply concerned at the Western atomic Powers' attitude towards the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests. After carefully following the discussion on this subject, and in particular the arguments adduced by the United States delegation at previous meetings and today, we can find no other reasons for this attitude than a persistent desire to continue nuclear tests, to perfect this murderous weapon and hence to continue the arms race.

The statement issued by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan on 9 April (ENDC/24) has only increased our anxiety, and similar feelings were revealed in several statements today. At the same time, this statement has strengthened our belief that the two Western Powers are guided by the motives I have just mentioned. The nature of this statement, which maintains the fixed

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

time-limit within which the United States and the United Kingdom have decided to resume their tests, merely points to the fact that those States wish at all costs to begin a new series of tests in order to perfect nuclear weapons. For it is obvious that the United States and United Kingdom are well aware of the position of the Soviet Union, which cannot agree to having imposed on it the system of control and inspection advocated by the West -- a system is not indispensable for ensuring that an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests is implemented.

Thus the Western Powers are seeking fresh justification for resuming tests by alleging that the Soviet Union is unwilling to reach an agreement. This manoeuvre is so transparent, however, that the United States is unlikely to succeed in convincing world opinion that it has been obliged to resume tests, and to do so necessarily in April, because the Soviet Union does not accept its ultimatum on control. And all this is taking place while the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament is engaged in drafting a treaty on general and complete disarmament: all this is taking place while world opinion, together with many delegations on our Committee, is demanding the cessation, once and for all, of tests of this murderous weapon, which are increasing the danger of war and at the same time poisoning the atmosphere, both literally and figuratively.

In the light of the declarations made by the Heads of Government of the two Western Powers, what are we to think of the statement made by their representatives in this Committee concerning their desire to disarm? What situation will our Committee be placed in if the intentions announced by the President of the United States are carried out? These are questions on which it is worth reflecting seriously.

The appeal made today by the Indian representative on behalf of his Government for a moratorium for the period of this Conference expressed the anxiety felt not only by India but by all nations at the prospect of the arms race being continued in its most dangerous sector. Will this appeal be ignored by the Western Powers, which are preparing to resume tests in a matter of days? I must point out that in his statement this morning Mr. Dean did not give us any reply to that question, but his preliminary remarks were not very encouraging.

Although, as Mr. Zorin, the Soviet representative, rightly stressed in his statement of 4 April (ENDC/PV.15), the conclusion of a treaty on the discontinuance of tests would still not be a disarmament measure, it would constitute an expression of the sincere desire of each nuclear Power to achieve general and complete disarmament.



(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

The discussion which has taken place so far has confirmed beyond any doubt that all explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water can be identified by national means of control and identification. There seems to be no further need to prove here that these three types of explosion are the essential elements of the whole process of testing.

So what is to prevent the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water? The Soviet proposals recommend that observance of the prohibition of these tests should be verified by national means of control and at the same time they introduce a moratorium on underground tests until a concerted control system for such tests has been developed as part of the international control system planned for carrying out general and complete disarmament (article 2, paragraph 3 of the Soviet draft). It must be emphasized that this moratorium is proposed in spite of the fact that underground explosions can also be detected by national means. Moreover, the British scientists who are carrying out experiments at Paul Mountain, Wyoming, with instruments that amplify seismic recordings, are also inclined to confirm the possibility of detecting such test explosions.

With regard to the problem of controlling tests, we may also refer to Mr. Wayland Young, an expert on disarmament questions, who asked in The Guardian a few days ago why the West was pressing for on-site inspection. His answer was that this is a political requirement, because Congress likes to control everything, in all circumstances, irrespective of real needs. Mr. Young goes on to say, a little later, that such inspection might have had some meaning three years ago, when seismology was a primitive science and small atom bombs were the height of achievement in military planning.

There is another aspect of this question. It is obvious that the discontinuance of nuclear tests forever could be achieved by the conclusion of a treaty by which all the parties solemnly undertook not to carry out any tests whatsoever. As we know, such a treaty could be concluded either before the signing of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, which would be the most desirable course from every point of view, or as a part of that treaty. The effectiveness of the treaty would be ensured by the system of control by national means proposed by the Soviet Union.

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

Nevertheless, in addition to, and apart from, the provisions of the treaty, there is a basic criterion which determines the validity and real effectiveness of every treaty. That is the interest of the parties in bringing it into force and keeping it in force. This interest increases with the importance of the object and purport of the agreement. Practical experience shows that the more the dangers of violating a treaty outweigh the potential advantages of doing so, the more certain it is that the treaty will be brought into force and implemented.

I think that in the matter of an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests, two points stand out with exceptional clarity: namely, the advantages of bringing the treaty into force and the dangers that would be incurred by violating it. A State which violated the treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear tests would clearly be assuming an immense responsibility and taking an enormous risk, whereas the advantages of violation would be very doubtful. This question was rightly raised by Ambassador Padilla Nervo, the representative of Mexico, who stressed in an earlier statement that a country which took such a course would incur not only the moral censure of the whole world, but also the inevitable consequences of any similar action taken by other States. It is certainly difficult to understand the arguments of Mr. Dean, the United States representative, who yesterday not only anticipated the possibility of an agreement being violated by the parties, but even accepted it as an inevitable fact. On what grounds did he do so? If we were to follow that reasoning, it would be hard to say that any international agreement existed at all.

In the light of these considerations, the Polish delegation considers that the whole problem of the prohibition of nuclear tests can be solved without great difficulty. All that is needed is the good will of the parties concerned. Our duty is to make the greatest possible efforts to fulfil the wish of millions of people throughout the world that all nuclear weapon tests should cease forever.

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I should like now to make a few remarks in my capacity as representative of Canada. We feel that we cannot remain silent in this very important meeting today, in which the statements have reached a very high level of responsibility. The subject which is being discussed is perhaps crucial to the opinion which the outside world will form of our activities here and to the chances of success in our major task of obtaining general and complete disarmament.

(The Chairman, Canada)

In the matter of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests, we are, as other representatives have made clear, somewhat at the eleventh hour. But the Canadian delegation feels that it is not too late, though it is very late. I should like to read into the record once more what the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada said in this regard at our fourth meeting on 19 March:

"... we are opposed to all nuclear weapon tests. In this we share the view of most other countries. Indeed, the major nuclear Powers themselves have stated at this very Conference that they would like to see all tests stopped. However, they now find themselves unable to reach final accord owing to disagreement on inspection. Is there, then, no alternative to another series of tests with all the harmful consequences that such action would bring? Is it not possible, within the framework of this Committee, to make the further effort which is required to break the deadlock? In my opinion, such an effort must be made, for otherwise the prospects of this Conference itself could be seriously threatened." (ENDC/PV.4, page 16)

He concluded by saying:

"In the minds of the public the impression has been created, because of the disagreement in these nuclear test talks, that this Conference is going to be a failure. This, I submit, is a very bad situation and one which I hope will be clarified ... Countries which do not possess nuclear weapons cannot put a stop to these tests. However, we can and do appeal to the nuclear States to do everything in their power to see that a solution is not further delayed." (Ibid.)

The Canadian delegation has heard with the greatest interest and sympathy the statements made by the eight non-aligned members of this Committee. We would like particularly to support the appeal of the representative of Mexico, which, if I understood it correctly, was that the nuclear Powers should submit again to their Governments, with great seriousness, the suggestions which have been submitted to them over the past few weeks, and particularly the last week or so, by the non-aligned States -- that is, the suggestions concerning the possibilities of achieving some agreement based on a move from the present positions held by the nuclear Powers. We are very sympathetic to the efforts which these States have made to find some ground where the views of the two sides could meet.

(The Chairman, Canada)

We were also impressed with what was said by the representative of Nigeria when he summarized the statements made by the Soviet Union on the one side and the United Kingdom on the other on the support which they believe the non-aligned nations give to their positions. I think his purpose was to draw attention to what the non-aligned nations really want, that is, a cessation of tests and some effective measure of international control associated with any agreement.

But, basically, after listening to the speeches this morning, I feel that what all those nations here which are not members of one alliance or another want is an agreement, and this means that there must be a reconsideration of positions.

We heard with interest the representative of the Soviet Union, who, as I understood him, said he was ready to think through all suggestions and ponder all possibilities. We heard a similar statement from the United States representative, that these suggestions had been considered and would continue to be considered.

We have seen from the development of this nuclear testing situation that action creates reaction, and so it goes on. Cannot this process be stopped somewhere? It seems to us that the representatives of the nuclear Powers here, in their arguments, are like men wrestling on the edge of a precipice. Cannot they break loose, stand back, and think of the precipice that is before them? We do not think that, even if nuclear tests took place, this would end the possibility of general and complete disarmament, but it certainly would have a grave effect on the proceedings of this Conference and on the possibility of reaching any early agreement.

I felt it my duty, as representative of Canada, to put these views on record at this meeting.

Mr. HAJEK (Czechoslovakia): The Czechoslovak delegation has listened with the utmost attention to the speeches which have been made here this morning, especially to those of the eight neutral Powers represented here. We subscribe to the concern which they displayed about the situation which has been created in this Committee and in the international climate by the threat of the impending nuclear tests to be held this month. We share as well the feeling of responsibility before public opinion that these delegations invoked.

(Mr Hajek, Czechoslovakia)

In fact, this feeling of responsibility towards our peoples, towards humanity and towards world public opinion has been invoked at our meetings from the beginning of the Conference, and, I would like to remind the Committee that in most cases this responsibility has been invoked in connexion with the impending nuclear tests.

At yesterday's meeting of the Committee the representative of the United States read out to us the joint appeal of President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan to Chairman Khrushchev. It is a message which has been presented, both in the Committee and outside in the press, as a new, significant initiative and as a last attempt to reach agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests. I must confess that my delegation was very disappointed when it read that joint message and when it heard the statement of the representative of the United States yesterday and some parts of his statement today. What, in fact, have we read and what have we heard?

The joint message is a restatement of the old position of the West on the question of control. I would say that it is another attempt on the part of the Western nuclear Powers to exert pressure on world public opinion, on the Government of the Soviet Union, and on the deliberations of this Committee. It appears to be a continuation of the policy which began on the eve of the deliberations of this Conference, during the early part of March, when the Governments of the Western nuclear Powers declared that unless agreement could be reached in a short period of time on the cessation of nuclear tests on the basis of the Western proposals they would conduct nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere during the latter part of April.

At one of our previous meetings, my delegation asked why that statement was made on the very eve of the deliberations of this Conference. We asked why the authors of this statement decided to cast such a dark shadow over the work of our Conference and why they wanted to put us under this pressure, which we all feel, during our discussions of this question? Unfortunately we have not received any answer to this question, which, I believe, is asked not only by many delegations in this room but also by the world.

(Mr. Hajek, Czechoslovakia)

In his first statement, made on 16 March in the general debate (ENDC/PV.3), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, Mr. David, pointed out that this decision of the United States and the United Kingdom Governments would have a very unfavourable impact on the work of our Conference. I think we can feel this impact once again at today's meeting.

The joint message that we heard yesterday, and the statement of the representative of the United States in the Committee today, stress once again the argument for the necessity of having international control. I do not want to dwell again on this question, because I think that everything that needs to be said has already been said. However, I would like to make just one point.

In our view it is possible today to ensure reliable control of all nuclear tests by the existing national means of detection. Hardly anyone has any doubts that, with respect to nuclear tests in the atmosphere and all other tests except underground tests, reliable control can be ensured by existing national detection systems. I believe that this feeling is already deeply rooted in world public opinion. In this connexion, I would like to quote a respectable British Sunday newspaper, one which certainly cannot be suspected of engaging in communist propaganda, namely the Observer. I quote from its edition of 1 April 1962:

"Whatever dispute there may be about identification of some nuclear tests underground and in high altitudes, there is no doubt that tests in the atmosphere can be identified by national instruments."

It seems to us that there is a wide discrepancy in the argumentation and position of the Western Powers. On the one hand, they base their demand for the introduction of control on alleged scientific and technical data related to underground tests. On the other hand, they make use of these data to justify their decision to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere.

It seems to us that this is merely an attempt to press certain demands, which are unfounded from the scientific and technical point of view and which are unacceptable to the other side, namely the Soviet Union; it is an attempt to justify a decision which was taken some time ago, namely a decision to undertake nuclear testing in the atmosphere at any price.

(Mr. Hajek, Czechoslovakia)

In some of the statements made both in the Committee and outside, and in comments in the Western press in connexion with the latest joint message, it is again asserted that the decision to carry out nuclear tests in the atmosphere was forced upon the Western nuclear Powers by the necessity of ensuring the security of the Western Powers and even world peace. For instance, on 11 April we read in The New York Times an editorial from which I quote the following:

"Such tests are an inexorable military necessity to maintain the balance of power, or, rather, the balance of terror, on which unfortunately depend both our own security and world peace."

I think that at this Conference we often have to consider whether the balance of terror, the balance of fear, is really a sound basis for any State security. I think it has been very eloquently stated here by some of our colleagues -- and I will not repeat a point which is self-evident -- that the balance of terror cannot be a basis for the consolidation of peace and for the safeguarding of the security of any country. On the other hand, however, even accepting for argument's sake the contention that it is necessary to maintain the balance of power, this is in apparent contradiction of the position taken up in statements by several official personalities and in general propaganda in the West, namely, that even at the present time the West has superiority over the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons. Then what kind of maintenance of the balance of power is that, and what would be the purpose of these tests made with such intentions?

As far as the necessity of international control is concerned, I think we have mentioned what is the general feeling of public opinion. May I be allowed to refer to one fact which is I think common to our delegation and other delegations here? We here in Geneva all get hundreds of letters; we receive visits from representatives of different peace organizations, representatives of peoples throughout the world irrespective of their beliefs, nationalities or political views. What do they all ask of us? In those hundreds of letters that we get, and in those many visits we receive, we are never asked about the problem of international control: we are always asked what to do to stop this danger of tests now impending, what to do to end the spiral of the armaments race.

(Mr. Hajek, Czechoslovakia)

I think that all these visitors and all these correspondents are really expressing goodwill. We share not only the goodwill but the concern that, should there be another series of atmospheric tests, the general atmosphere and climate of international relations not only would be literally contaminated but would be threatened in the widest sense of the word, and our Conference itself would be in an extremely difficult position. The nations would certainly ask what was the sense of our talks here. They would rightly ask how these talks could be reconciled with the step to be taken by one of the chief participants in this Conference, a step which would certainly lead to further intensification of the arms race.

In this connexion may I be allowed to recall to the Conference the noble words of Mr. Padilla Nervo, when he stated that public opinion condemns the carrying out of nuclear explosions?

We have full sympathy with and we welcome the initiative of a number of delegations at this Conference whose representatives are seeking a way out of this situation and who wish to prevent further testing, which would place the Conference in an untenable position.

What is the core of the situation? We think, and we associate ourselves with all those who feel, that this is not the time for ultimatums. We feel it is time to look for a solution, taking into account all the suggestions which have been made, with the greatest goodwill, to find a way out of a threatening impasse. At the same time no action should be taken which would prevent us from finding such a way out, and that means having no tests.

We are convinced that the proposals which have been put forward should be studied thoroughly, and we noted with satisfaction that the representative of the Soviet Union said in his speech at this meeting that he would take all these proposals into consideration and would study them thoroughly. We note, also, that the representative of the United States assured us that his delegation will forward all these proposals to his Government. We believe that the strongest point in those proposals is the demand that no further tests should be carried out, at least while the Conference is in session. Therefore we join with those who are demanding that the Western nuclear Powers should, instead of conducting nuclear weapon tests, give proof of their sincerity by ensuring that the path of our Conference towards the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament is not obstructed by atomic tests.



Mr. GODDELL (United Kingdom): I shall make only a few comments this morning on the very interesting and valuable discussion that we have had here today because I shall want, like others, to study very carefully the comments that we have heard and to see if they can give us any help and guidance in this most difficult problem that confronts us.

I think that some valuable thoughts have been put to us this morning --- perhaps not many fresh ideas, but that is scarcely surprising in a subject on which we have all tried for so long to find fresh ways out of our present difficulties. We have all listened, I am sure, with care and appreciation to the appeal which the representative of India gave us on behalf of his Government. We realize the sincerity with which that appeal is made.

I was struck, too, by the statement of the representative of Ethiopia that no one has a monopoly of wisdom. How much I agree with him! But I think we have had a consensus of wisdom around this table this morning which we shall all want to ponder very much. I am afraid I could not agree wholeheartedly, though, with the representative of Ethiopia when he went on to say that both sides maintain their rigid position. Now, I do say to him in all sincerity that we in the West have genuinely tried to seek accord. We have been flexible. I, myself, in this room, I think, and certainly in the Sub-Committee, have said that we are willing to scrap all our proposals and start again if only we can have an agreed basis. And we must have an agreed basis if we are going to make progress. That has been where we have broken down in our recent discussions. We have been unable to find common ground because we are not now starting from an agreed basis. We did have an agreed basis, of course, for three years: the 1958 experts' report.

The representative of the United Arab Republic -- and one or two other representatives, I believe -- quoted General Assembly resolution 1648 (XVI). He reminded us that the last words of operative paragraph 3 of that resolution are "under appropriate international control". That was our common basis of approach. That principle has been endorsed, as we have been reminded in this resolution and in the following resolution, 1649 (XVI). It was the basis on which we all considered these matters.

Perhaps I might call the attention of the members of this Committee to what I myself said in the Sub-Committee on Monday, 9 April:

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

"No conference can make progress -- certainly cannot succeed -- unless there is some common ground on which to negotiate. That is a simple, basic fact. For three years we had such common ground, and we were therefore able to make progress -- and we did come within sight of a treaty. This common ground was provided by the political decisions of our three Governments that nuclear weapon testing should be discontinued on the basis of a system of international detection and international inspection." (ENDC/SC.I/FV.7, page 25)

That was the common ground. If we could get back to that common ground, I believe we could rapidly conclude a treaty and there would be no need for further tests.

I sometimes wonder, listening to some of the comments around this table, whether all the representatives actually realize the full impact of the sudden decision we were confronted with on 28 November, when suddenly, after three years of agreement on this basis, we were told that all this was thrown overboard. We have never been given an adequate reason why. Perhaps, to draw my colleagues' attention to this more dramatically, I might remind them that we, sitting round this table, in the primary discussion for which we were called together -- namely to achieve general and complete disarmament --, were brought here on a common basis too, a common basis established last year and endorsed by the United Nations, a common basis embodied in the Agreed Principles from which our general disarmament discussions flow. I would ask members of the Committee this: if one of the countries here were suddenly to renounce the Agreed Principles, under which our disarmament discussions are taking place, and to say that it would no longer go forward on such a basis, what impact would that have on the rest of us here? That, I would suggest, is an exact analogy to what happened on 28 November in regard to nuclear tests. We were confronted with an entirely new position. And it is because of that -- and only because of that, I believe -- that we have been unable to make any further progress.

I do say to my colleagues that this is a factor which we cannot ignore, which confronts us and from which we have been unable to get away at all. That is why my United States colleague and I have again and again come back to this factor. It seems to me the only sheet anchor from which we can hope to re-establish a position where genuine negotiation could take place.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

The representative of Nigeria, who said the most striking things, I thought, this morning, commented -- if I understood him correctly -- that no variation had been seen in the Western proposals to take account of the scientific developments since 1958. I would say to him that since 1958, whenever there has been any question of dispute, we Western Powers have shown again and again our willingness to have further discussions between scientists of our countries and scientists of the Soviet Union. We have offered this again recently. We have said that if the Soviet Union says the scientific position has changed, let our scientists get together and once more establish an agreed basis, because we believe that is the only way we can go forward. But we have not had the response that I should have hoped for in this particular regard. I believe this is a most important point. If people challenge the basis on which our previous discussions went forward, then we should have the opportunity of getting our scientists together again, to establish the position once more. But when we have proposed that, we have been met with only abusive criticism of Western scientists. I think that is unfortunate.

The representative of Nigeria used another phrase which I thought very striking. He said:

"... it is our view that the issue with which we are concerned is essentially political; the aid of science is merely required to give the arguments added faith." (Supra, page 16)

I thought that a very telling phrase, and I entirely agree with it. It is on that basis that I put forward once again this suggestion that we might get our scientists together to consider the position again and try to give us that added security and faith which would perhaps enable a fresh political decision to be taken.

Several representatives referred to the fact that both the Western side and the Soviet Union claim they have the support of the non-aligned nations, and my own words have been quoted in this context. Well, after listening to today's discussion my feeling is that neither the Western side nor the Soviet Union can honestly claim the unreserved support of the eight non-aligned nations represented here. I think both sides have been told that they should go away and think again. I am perfectly happy to study again any proposals that have been put to us and will certainly do so with the utmost sincerity. I am most anxious, as I know my United States colleague is too, to find a way to make progress. That is the spirit in which I hope we can continue our discussions. But one cannot get away from these basic factors to which I have referred.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

In his remarks the representative of the Soviet Union said that the United States and the United Kingdom had thrown out a challenge to the entire world, and he said at another point that those Powers were merely seeking pretexts to enable them to continue testing. Well, I really do not want to bandy words on this, but it is abundantly clear to every delegation here that in fact it is not we who have thrown out a challenge; that challenge was thrown out last September by the Soviet Union, and no amount of talking now can get away from that simple fact; no amount of talking can destroy what has actually happened. When the Soviet Union chose to resume testing it must have known, just as the rest of us must have known, that unfortunate consequences could flow from that. The Soviet Union must have known that it could not take such unilateral action, after a period of three years in which neither side had tested, without provoking repercussions. That is the real position, as we all know if we are honest in our hearts, in regard to this matter.

There is another point in connexion with the Soviet representative's remarks. He asked a direct question, whether the United States and the United Kingdom were willing to give an undertaking not to test while negotiations continued in the Sub-Committee, and he said the Soviet Union would give such an assurance. I do not want to sound disrespectful to the representative of the Soviet Union; I would only remind him of what happened once before when we relied on such a unilateral undertaking. As I have already said, one cannot wipe out past history by talking here; one cannot deny what has taken place. So what is the use of making such an offer now after what has gone before in this regard? I would say to him that for that reason we cannot take up such an offer, which would give us no security at all so far as I can see.

I had hoped that in the course of his remarks the representative of the Soviet Union might be able to tell us something more regarding the special message which my own Prime Minister sent to Chairman Khrushchev a day or two ago (ENDC/25). I shall await with interest the reply to that message, and I hope very much that Chairman Khrushchev will respond to the appeal made therein. It is still not too late, if we can have genuine good will, to get an effective treaty with effective international control.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

Both the representative of Poland and the representative of Czechoslovakia did the United Kingdom the honour of quoting from British newspapers; I am always glad when British newspapers get prominence in this way. The representative of Poland quoted from the Guardian and the representative of Czechoslovakia from the Observer. I am afraid I have not been able to get a copy of the Observer, but I have got a copy of another issue of the Guardian. I always think it is interesting -- and perhaps it is educative to some of my colleagues from certain countries -- to see that different points of view do appear even in the same British newspaper; I wish it were so in every country of the world. On Monday, 9 April, of this year the Guardian contained a most interesting article by Mr. John Maddox, who is quoted as the Guardian's science correspondent and so should be looked upon as authoritative in this regard. I will not bore the Conference by quoting much of this article, but this is the first part:

"Evidence is now available which discounts recent reports that the detection of underground atomic tests has been radically simplified by advances in the techniques of seismology ..."

It goes on to elaborate on this point, that in fact there has not been the scientific advance which some people have claimed.

I would commend that article to the representative of Poland; I am sure he would not wish to read only one copy of the Guardian but would like to read others as well. I think this shows the scientific complications with which we are confronted in this respect, and reinforces the need which I indicated earlier for more meetings of scientists in order to get an agreed basis on which our discussions can take place.

The representative of Czechoslovakia suggested that the West had accepted the fact that tests could be detected and identified in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water; but I am afraid that in fact this is not correct. I think Mr. Zorin too referred to this when he spoke yesterday, but, as I say, it is not correct. Perhaps I could just mention the facts very briefly.

In the first place there was an agreed report by the Technical Working Group on the detection and identification of high altitude nuclear explosions, in which Soviet scientists participated, and that was submitted in 1959 (GEN/DNT/HAF/8). I do not know if the Soviet Union has now rejected this as well as the report of the 1958 experts, but this 1959 report proposed a complicated international system in order to detect events at high altitudes and in outer space. Certainly there

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

are no national systems of this kind in existence at the moment, and it seems to me it would be far better to launch international co-operation in this field than to insist that, as a result of signing a treaty on the completely restrictive lines suggested by the Soviet Union, every interested country should be obliged to set up its own detection system to deal with events in this environment.

So much, then, for outer space; but as regards explosions under water we have no knowledge of detection systems operating on a world-wide scale under national auspices, any more than we have for outer space. In 1958 the experts recommended (EXL/NUC/28, pages 15, 20) that there should be ten ships on the world's oceans operating in the international control system, which would be responsible for detecting underwater events in remote areas. There are no such ships at the moment, and I doubt whether it is desirable, in a treaty such as that proposed by the Soviet Union, to encourage the construction of national fleets for this purpose. Surely it is far better that arrangements for the detection of potential events under water should be carried out under international auspices.

This leaves the position in the atmosphere. This subject has already been dealt with so many times in this Conference that I do not propose to labour it now. I would only remind my colleagues of the response (GEN/DNT/121) which my Prime Minister and the United States President got from Premier Khrushchev when they made a proposition in this respect last September; it was harsh in the extreme and it did graphically state the dangers in regard to underground inspection from such a limited and restricted treaty. So I would say to my colleagues that I see no ground for progress there.

I repeat: I am as anxious as anyone round this table -- and I know my United States colleague is too -- to find a way in which we could get back to an agreed basis of discussion which would enable us to solve our problems. We are ready, anxious and willing to continue these discussions. I myself have studied with the utmost care everything that has been said by our colleagues from the non-aligned States on previous occasions, and I shall certainly do so again today in the hope that they will help us in this most difficult problem. I only wish that we from the Sub-Committee had better progress to report. I get no pleasure in our sitting there making speeches at one another. I would far prefer that we could negotiate effectively again, and I welcome any help that we may get in that regard.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I think the unanimous feeling of the Conference is that a fresh effort should be made to reach an agreement. As I said in my previous statement, the question which in our opinion should be carefully examined and might lead us to an agreement is as follows: How can international control be established without prejudice to military secrets? -- those secrets which no one in the West has any intention of violating by means of test verification. The two terms of the problem should not be irreconcilable. In our opinion, a practical and detailed study of this matter should be made. We should be very glad if the Soviet delegation would be good enough to explain precisely and frankly where it sees the danger of espionage in the limited system of control proposed by the delegation of the United States and United Kingdom. I propose that the Conference should soon hold a restricted meeting on this specific question, at which no record would be taken, as has already been done successfully in other circumstances on the proposal of the Indian delegation.

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): We have a proposal by the Italian delegation that at an early date we should have a further meeting under the informal procedure, that is, with no verbatim record, to discuss this question. I would suggest that this proposal might be considered by the co-Chairmen at their next meeting.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): We are really astonished that, on the eve of the resumption of nuclear tests by the United States and the United Kingdom, which constitutes the real danger now threatening the world, delegations should be trying to shift their ground and change the issue. It is this very time, when our Conference ought to be occupied with this blackmail, this ultimatum delivered by the most highly qualified representatives of these two countries, that is chosen to ask us to explain why we do not want international control.

I should like the Conference to give a little time to this matter. For the question we have to consider now is not at all the one just put by the Italian delegation. The real question is whether we shall be able to go on working at this Conference without being exposed to the threat of the nuclear explosions planned by certain States. Is the Conference to be allowed to continue its work in an atmosphere that will permit us to formulate a treaty on general and complete disarmament and to study the other problems connected with it?

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

I therefore appeal to the Italian delegation, in the belief that at this stage we should not engage in manoeuvres to facilitate the task of those who are jeopardizing the work of our Conference.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I should like to draw the attention of members of this Committee to the mysterious promptness of the reply given (Supra, page 77) to a most important question, put during today's discussion, by the United Kingdom representative, who, it seems to me, was in a hurry to answer it in the negative. The question was whether the United States and United Kingdom Governments were prepared to give an undertaking not to carry out nuclear tests while negotiations are going on in this Committee. As could be gathered from the statement by the United States representative, he has given no reply to this question for the time being. He informed the Committee that he would report to his Government on this matter and on the discussions which have taken place at this meeting.

However, the United Kingdom representative, as I gathered from his statement, has already answered this question in the negative. He repeated the question, and asked what would be the use of making such an offer after what had gone before, and gave us to understand that the United Kingdom Government did not intend to refrain from the tests scheduled for the end of April.

I think it is too serious a matter to allow us simply to overlook this hasty reply, a negative one to boot, by the United Kingdom representative. To tell the truth, I wondered who was more interested in these tests -- the United States or the United Kingdom? The United States, as is evident from Mr. Dean's statement, has not given a reply, at least at this juncture. The United Kingdom representative gave a negative reply. The conclusion may be drawn from this that the United Kingdom representative and his Government are perhaps more interested in carrying out these tests than even the United States Government. This is very strange indeed, because in Parliament, as well as in official statements -- that is to say, in statements made here -- the representatives of the United Kingdom Government have all the time been saying and trying to persuade us that they were not interested in carrying out tests and that they were striving to put an end to all testing.



(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Yet here the United Kingdom representative, without having received any instructions from his Government on this new question, which has only been asked today, has already given a negative reply. I think that we ought not to overlook this fact. Personally, I consider this reply a very serious one, and I think that the Committee cannot accept it without serious explanations of the motives behind it, and without serious concern for the fate of our negotiations.

I should like to hope that the United Kingdom representative was in too great a hurry to reply, and that the delegation of the other allied Power, which appears to be the principal one in regard to preparing these tests, will give us a more soothing reply when it receives its Government's instructions. I should like to hope so, and I think that everyone here hopes so too.

Therefore, if we are to have further discussions on this question, as suggested by the representative of Italy, it seems to me that the principal question on which views should be exchanged is whether or not any tests will be carried out during our Conference. Are the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom prepared to give an undertaking not to carry out such tests? I have already informed the Conference of the Soviet Government's stand on this question. Our reply is in the affirmative. Therefore, if any meeting were to be convened on this question, we should be in favour of discussing precisely this question, and we should be prepared to discuss it, not in a closed, but in an open meeting of our Committee.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I always seem to be in difficulty with Mr. Zorin, whatever I say, whether I do or do not say anything. I try so hard to please him: it is disappointing. On this occasion he says I answered too quickly. Well, I leave it to my colleagues around this table to judge. I do not think I was tempestuous: certainly I did not feel tempestuous. But I will admit that perhaps an element of -- I do not want to use a harsh word -- disbelief entered my voice when I was answering the question, because I had in mind who was asking it.

As I reminded the Conference, one cannot forget what has gone before; one cannot forget what happened on a previous occasion. I recognize there was no agreement on a previous occasion, but each side had made unilateral statements -- certainly the Soviet Union had made one -- that it would not be the first to test.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

And so it seemed to me that a further such proposal put forward now could not have -- I put it no higher than this -- as much value as it did on the previous occasion. It was for that reason that I gave the reply I did, and I am quite content to be judged by my colleagues around this table as to whether that was a fair reply or not.

It does not give one any pleasure to have to say these things, but it is no good trying to mask from our eyes the realities of the situation with which we were faced when the Soviet Union unilaterally, of its own accord, last September started this new series of tests. That is what lies behind it all.

As to whether there is a difference of opinion between myself and my United States colleague, I speak for myself here; I am quite certain that I speak also with his approval. Although I have not had the opportunity of getting together with him yet, I shall certainly have the pleasure of doing so shortly after this meeting.

I think the Western position on this is quite plain.

As I have said, it gives us no pleasure to have to give answers of this sort; but I think it is better to do so than to seek to mislead the Conference, and I merely sought to do the courtesy of giving an immediate answer. I am sorry if that has displeased Mr. Zorin. I will try on another occasion to find a way of dealing with his questions that satisfies him better. I assure him I will give every thought to what he has said, just as I do to what is said by every other representative. I am not here to try to make debating points: I am here to try and make progress in our discussions -- and that will still be my attitude, whatever any representative says.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): The Soviet representative referred to the fact that I had said that I would report to my Government all the very interesting ideas that have been put forward this morning. I certainly did say that; I certainly intend to do that; and I am sure that those ideas will be given very careful consideration by my Government. But I must say I thought I had made it abundantly clear that I did not believe that the United States would find acceptable the idea of a further uninspected, uncontrolled moratorium, in view of our previous experience with an uninspected, uncontrolled moratorium which the

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Soviet Government violated -- especially as this very subject has been dealt with specifically on a previous occasion by the President of the United States. I therefore do not wish to entertain very much hope for this suggestion, and I would like to associate myself fully with the remarks of my United Kingdom colleague.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its nineteenth meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Burns, the representative of Canada.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Ethiopia, India, Italy, Sweden, Burma, Mexico, the United Arab Republic, Nigeria, Brazil, the Soviet Union, the United States, Poland, Canada, Czechoslovakia, the United Kingdom and Bulgaria.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 13 April 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.

